Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
All Sprouts Content

Sprouts

5-28-2009

Reconfiguring Modularity: Closing Capability
Gaps in Digital Innovation
Ola Henfridsson
Viktoria Institute, ola.henfridsson@wbs.ac.uk

Lars Mathiassen
Georgia State University, lmathiassen@gsu.edu

Fredrik Svahn
Viktoria Institute, fredrik.svahn@ait.gu.se

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all
Recommended Citation
Henfridsson, Ola; Mathiassen, Lars; and Svahn, Fredrik, " Reconfiguring Modularity: Closing Capability Gaps in Digital Innovation"
(2009). All Sprouts Content. 277.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sprouts_all/277

This material is brought to you by the Sprouts at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in All Sprouts Content by an
authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Working Papers on Information Systems

ISSN 1535-6078

Reconfiguring Modularity: Closing Capability Gaps in
Digital Innovation
Ola Henfridsson
Viktoria Institute, Sweden
Lars Mathiassen
Georgia State University, USA
Fredrik Svahn
Viktoria Institute, Sweden

Abstract
It is widely acknowledged that modularity, as an approach to both product design and
organization design, provides product developing firms with dynamic capabilities that allow
them to more effectively respond to changes in the environment. However, the innovation
literature is silent on how such dynamic capabilities might require reconfiguration as firms in
traditional industries embed digital technology into their products. Drawing on theories of
modularity, capability, and software engineering, we therefore conducted a multi-level study
of car navigation technology. On the industry level, we investigated how automakersâ
traditional hierarchical control over the innovation process was challenged as they faced
multiple digital options for navigation systems design. On the firm level, we investigated how
one large automaker exploited these options by reconfiguring modularity and distributing
control over the innovation process. The paper makes two inter-related contributions. First,
we extend the innovation literature by identifying and characterizing a capability gap that
product developing firms in traditional industries face if they merely accommodate digital
technology within the confines of current approaches to modularity. Second, we present a
new understanding of modularity that draws on the innovation literature as well as the
software engineering literature. Rather than relying mainly on components as interrelated
physical parts of a hierarchical system, we argue that digital innovation requires product
developers to fully exploit physical as well as logical design perspectives, and to differentiate
between components as parts, as patterns, and as platforms. We posit that the capability to
combine such approaches to modularity is essential for effectively embedding digital
technology into traditional physical products.
Keywords: digital innovation, modularity, capability, innovation networks, parts, patterns,
platforms, product innovation
Permanent URL: http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22
Copyright: Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works License
Reference: Henfridsson, O., Mathiassen, L., Svahn, F. (2009). "Reconfiguring Modularity:
Closing Capability Gaps in Digital Innovation," Viktoria Institute, Sweden . Sprouts:
Working Papers on Information Systems, 9(22). http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

INTRODUCTION
Digital innovation is becoming commonplace in product development within traditional
industries. A modern automobile consists of a set of computer networks interconnecting
numerous electronic control units and sensors. The amount of software in cars now exceeds ten
million lines of code (Broy et al. 2007) and as much as 80 % of innovations in a car can be traced
to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) (Leen and Heffernan 2002). Enabled by
gradual appropriation of new ICT capabilities (King and Lyytinen 2004), digital innovation has
rendered radically improved functionality of many of the car’s components including brakes,
climate, engine, and transmission.
Digital innovation presents new options and threats to automakers. Embedding ICT
capabilities, the digital car may, for instance, enable new forms of business models (Barabba et
al. 2002), design supply chains (Joglekar and Rosenthal 2003), and product differentiation and
variety (Andreasson and Henfridsson 2009). At the same time, the effective utilization of ICT as
an options generator depends on the acquisition of capabilities that position organizations to
seize emergent opportunities (Sambamurthy et al. 2003). It is widely acknowledged that such
dynamic capability, i.e., a firm’s capability to deploy resources for a desired end result (Amit and
Schoemaker 1993), can be acquired through modularity as an approach to both product design
and organization design.
However, existing approaches to modularity in product developing firms are tightly
coupled with the idea of decomposing products into loosely coupled components, hence relying
on an understanding of components as interrelated physical parts of hierarchical systems
(Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000). Because there are intrinsic differences between
traditional products and software products (Brooks 1987), approaches to modularity in software
engineering emphasize physical as well as logical perspectives in which data and software can be
physically co-located without being logically bundled into the same component and vice versa
(Parnas 1972; Gamma et al. 1993, 1995). Moreover, design of software systems aggregate
components through a variety of architectural configurations, including hierarchies as well as
networks (Mathiassen et al. 2002) and they rely on different notions of components: as
interrelated parts of a larger system (Parnas 1972); as generalized patterns of solutions to specific
classes of problems (Gamma et al. 1993, 1995; Alexander 1964, 1999); and as common
platforms for developing a variety of specific software applications (Dikel et al. 1997; Bosch
2001; Pohl et al. 2005).
New forms of competition and collaboration in innovation leadership in the context of
the digitized car (Henfridsson et al. 2009) challenge automakers’ traditional approaches to
modularity and hierarchical control over the innovation process (Yoo et al. 2008). In responding
to this challenge, automakers need to develop new practices that integrate approaches to
modularity from the software industry and enable the firm to distribute control over the
innovation process. It is, however, generally difficult to acquire new capabilities in firms
operating in industries where the dominant mode of product development has been shaped over
long periods of incremental innovation (Abernathy 1978; Anderson and Tushman 1990).
Automakers might, as a result, experience an increasing capability gap between current
innovation practices and the capabilities needed in order to leverage from digital innovation.
Referring to capability gaps as “the distance between needed capabilities and the firm’s existing
capability base” (Capron and Mitchell 2009, p. 295), we argue that closing such gaps is essential
for automakers involved in digital innovation and the current confines of modularity therefore
2
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need to be reconfigured by developing new digital capabilities. Such capability reconfiguration
can take the forms of substitution, evolution, or transformation (Lavie 2006).
On this backdrop, this research adopts a multi-theoretic lens drawing on theories of
modularity (Schilling 2000), capability (Capron and Mitchell 2009; Lavie 2006), and software
engineering (Brooks 1987; Pohl et al. 2005) to addresses the following research questions: Why
are automakers traditional approaches to modularity in product design and organization design
challenged as they face a variety of new digital options for innovation? How can automakers
reconfigure traditional approaches to modularity to leverage new digital options as part of their
innovations? The research was conducted as a multi-level study of digital capability gaps in the
area of car navigation. First, we conducted an industry-level analysis to trace the development of
navigation technology and its impact on digital options and required firm capabilities. Our
content analysis (Krippendorff 2004) of publically available information about the navigation
market demonstrates that, over the last six-year period, technological options increased
dramatically and firm capabilities diverged among competitors. Second, we conducted a firmlevel analysis of how a global vehicle manufacturer, GlobalCarCorp, reconsidered and
reconfigured its modular architecture and hierarchical approach to controlling the innovation
process to close the experienced capability gap.
The paper makes two inter-related contributions. First, we extend the innovation
literature by identifying and characterizing a capability gap that product developing firms in
traditional industries face if they merely accommodate digital technology within the confines of
current approaches to modularity. In closing this gap, firms need to disintegrate digital
component packages and transcend existing approaches to modularity and innovation control.
Second, we present a new understanding of modularity that draws on the innovation literature as
well as the software engineering literature. The innovation literature’s focus on components as
interrelated physical parts of hierarchical systems (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Garud et al. 2003;
Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000) is extended to embrace physical as well as logical
design perspectives, and to differentiate between components as parts (Parnas 1972), as patterns
(Gamma et al. 1993, 1995; Alexander 1964, 1999), and as platforms (Dikel et al. 1997; Bosch
2001; Pohl et al. 2005). We posit that the capability to combine such approaches to modularity
and to distribute control over the innovation process is essential for effectively embedding digital
technology into traditional physical products.
MODULARITY IN DIGITAL INNOVATION
It is commonly agreed that modularity facilitates control over complex systems, allow for
concurrent design, and accommodate uncertainty (Baldwin and Clark 2000). At the heart of
modular design is the principle of loose coupling implemented in the form of interdependence
within, and independence across, product components (Baldwin and Clark 1997a; Ulrich 1995).
Such loose coupling allows organizations to manage product complexity through division of
expertise and isolation of changes to specific modules (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Parnas 1972).
This implementation of nearly decomposable systems (Simon 2002) provides firms with
strategic flexibility that allows them to incrementally improve and adapt product designs over
time (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996).
However, beyond these general principles of modularity, it is equally clear that the
modularity literature is divided along disciplinary lines. The innovation literature on modularity
(Baldwin and Clark 2000; Garud et al. 2003; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000;
3
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Sturgeon 2002; Ulrich 1995) is primarily focused on physical products and how such artifacts
can be modularized to gain competitive advantage in dynamic markets. The software engineering
literature (Bosch 2001; Dikel et al. 1997; Mathiassen et al. 2000; Gamma et al. 1993, 1995;
Parnas 1972; Pohl et al. 2005) is instead geared towards configurations of logical (software) and
physical (hardware) products and how such artifacts can be combined and integrated to improve
systems design.
Digital innovation in the traditional industries calls for embracing the wisdom of these
literatures simultaneously. Firms investing in digital innovation cannot afford adopting the
received knowledge of one of them at the expense of the other. Yet, institutionalized practices
and dominant designs can make it difficult to develop and host the capabilities needed to achieve
that balance (Abernathy 1978; Anderson and Tushman 1990). In what follows, we look more
closely at these streams of literature across elements of modularity and their implications for
digital innovation. In addition, we present modularity as a dynamic capability that needs
reconfiguration over time to bridge capability gaps that emerge from technological change
(Capron and Mitchell 2009; Lavie 2006).
Elements of Modularity
The notion of component is the fundamental element in a modular approach to
innovation. A comprehensive, yet not exhaustive, understanding of different notions of
components encapsulates both their nature as well as relationships between them. In terms of
nature, components can be understood as parts, patterns, or platforms (Baldwin and Clark 2000;
Alexander 1999; Pohl et al. 2005). These notions reflect different techniques of designing and
interpreting the modular structure of a product. Viewing components as physical parts is
common in the product innovation literature and directs attention to how components are
decomposed or aggregated (see e.g., Baldwin and Clark 2000, Ulrich 1995). Decomposition and
aggregation assume a part-whole relationship where parts are associated with the whole through
many-to-one relationships in hierarchical architectures.
Rather than only focusing on physical structure and potential for decomposition and
aggregation, patterns and platforms are logical constructs that directs attention to generalization
and specialization (Mathiassen et al. 2000). This goes especially for the notion of pattern that
stems from Alexander’s seminal writings on architectural pattern languages (Alexander 1979;
Gamma et al. 1993). In its simplest form, a pattern is “a generalized description of a problem and
a related solution” (Mathiassen et al. 2000, p.11). Although originating in architecture, the idea
of patterns has been adopted widely as a basis for understanding design and reuse of software
components and it assumes an instance-type relationship where components on lower and higher
levels are related in many-to-many relationships in network architectures.
Lastly, the notion of platform has found a home in both the innovation and software
engineering literatures (Pohl et al. 2005; Robertson and Ulrich 1998). The manufacturing
industry was pioneering in deploying platforms as “the common basis of all individual products
within a product family” as a strategy for achieving product variety in a cost-efficient way
(Halman et al. 2003, p. 150). Although not limited to a physical basis, this view is echoed in
writings about software platforms where a platform is seen as “a set of software subsystems and
interfaces that form a common structure from which a set of derivative products can be
efficiently developed and produced” (Pohl et al. 2005, p.15).
While all products are more or less modularized, the structuring of a product into
components is an intentional act to develop the capability to recombine and reuse components
4
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into new configurations (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000; Gamma et al. 1995).
However, the resulting capability does not only rely on the nature of the resulting components,
but equally on the relationships between and within components as expressed in the terms of
coupling and cohesion. Loose coupling, as opposed to tight coupling, between components
means that the inner working of a component is largely irrelevant and can be hidden to other
components (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Parnas 1972; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). Loosely
coupled components are therefore easier to modify and more available for new relationships in
reconfiguration of a modular system. The degree of coupling between components is dependent
on the specificity with which the component’s functionality is implemented (Schilling 2000). As
Schilling propose, “the degree to which functionality is achieved through component specificity
will be negatively related to increasing interfirm product modularity” (p. 322). As low degree of
component specificity can be achieved through application of standard interfaces such design
approaches can facilitate loose coupling and the adoption of a modular architecture.
The degree to which a component can be easily reused in new product configurations also
depends on the cohesiveness of the component itself (Yourdon and Constantine 1979). While
coupling concerns the independence between components, cohesion involves interdependences
within a component. Cohesion provides a measure of how well a component is tied together and
high cohesion ideally renders a component that produces a single and well-defined function
(Mathiassen et al. 2000). When components have high cohesion they are easier to modify, it is
more likely they will be resilient to changes in their environment, and last but not least, it is
easier to determine the fit of their functionality in other product configurations.
Control of Modular Architectures
As outlined in the organization and innovation literature (Baldwin and Clark 2000;
Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000), modularity implies a particular type of hierarchical
control. Rather than relying on coordination through the exercise of managerial authority, control
is inscribed into the interfaces between modules through design rules (Baldwin and Clark 2000).
As Sanchez and Mahoney (1996, p. 63-64) argue, “much work in product development may be
coordinated by specifying standardized component interfaces that govern the outputs of
component development processes”. Reflecting a shift from hierarchy through organization
design towards hierarchy through product design (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996), modular
architectures are often seen as an important element in the ongoing trend towards vertical
disintegration (Christensen 2006). Codifiable transfer of specifications from the product lead
firm, or the brand name firm, to a wide range of contract manufacturers plays an important role
in modular firm networks (Sturgeon 2002).
However, the portrayal of components as elements organized through a hierarchical
structure where a product-lead firm determines requirements only provides a partial
understanding of control of modular architectures. When viewed as patterns or platforms,
component control is better described as networked. This can be traced to the instance-type
relationship of such components. A specific instance of a pattern is typically not exclusive to its
type but can belong to other patterns in a many-to-many relationship between components on
lower and higher levels. For instance, map data can be used beyond car navigation. Using a
common design pattern for cross-vehicle distribution of information about road curvature, slope
information, speed limits, and accident black spots, map data can enrich and improve a wide
range of active safety services (Loewenau et al. 2007; Ress et al. 2008). Thus, this pattern,
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typically referred to as “electronic horizon”, is used by engineers with heterogeneous objectives
located across organizational units. Similar reasoning can be applied to components as platforms.
Reconfiguring Modularity for Digital Innovation
Modularity provides dynamic capabilities by allowing product developing firms to
develop architectures that allow them to deploy organizational and technical resources in a
flexible way to effectively respond to changes in the environment (cf. Amit and Schoemaker
1993; Baldwin and Clark 2000). Given loosely coupled components that display high cohesion,
modular architectures help product developing firms reconfigure their products and reuse its
components to improve its competitiveness to develop attractive offers on the market. However,
as Schilling (2000) notes optimizing for maximum independence may negatively affect the
performance of a product because of loss of synergistic specificity, i.e., “the degree to which a
system achieves greater functionality by its components being specific to one another” (p.316).
Thus, the decomposition of a product into a modular architecture always involves “a balance
between the pressure to become modular and the functionality gained through synergistic
specificity” (p. 317). For instance, in-car navigation systems typically come with tightly
integrated components such as display and hard drive, although these resources are general and
could be used to support other functions as well. Essentially, the integrated design secures
quality of service, latency, and the necessary bandwidth and access for the navigation function.
Pressures to change this balance by increasing the degree of modularization of a product
derives from the diversity of technological options available and the differentiation in firm
capabilities in a market (Schilling 2000). Diversity in technological options increases the number
of available product configurations for the customer and results in a higher pressure on the
product developing firm to increase its flexibility. Similarly, differentiation in firm capabilities
increases the potential gains reaped from specialization in particular components of the product
and therefore results in higher pressure on product developing firms to further modularize its
product.
Responding to pressures of options diversity and capability differentiation, firms need to
consider assumptions about the nature and relationships of the components underlying its
modular architectures. In digital innovation, involving the embedding of ICT options in physical
products, such assumptions would necessarily incorporate both physical and logical components,
involve both coupling and cohesion relationships, and imply hierarchical as well as networked
forms of control. This escalation of complexity for product developing firms challenges them to
reconfigure modularity as their core capability for product innovation (Capron and Mitchell
2009; Lavie 2006; Schilling 2000). As noted by Lavie (2006), capability reconfiguration
basically takes three forms: substitution, evolution, and transformation. Substitution refers to the
replacement of a core capability as a result of existing competencies being superfluous through
introduction of superior technology (Tushman and Anderson 1986). While appropriation of ICT
capabilities in physical products certainly necessitates new capability, substitution appears as a
less likely form of capability reconfiguration as logical perspectives on modularity rather
interlace than replace physical perspectives. As for evolution, it pays heed to reconfiguration in
the presence of path dependencies that form institutional pressures to further develop capabilities
along current directions (Nelson and Winter 1982). Capability reconfiguration is then a form of
path creation that evolves as mindful deviation by designers and entrepreneurs from the existing
path (Garud et al. 2003; Henfridsson et al. 2009). Lastly, transformation denotes an objectivedriven process of changing capabilities (Lavie 2006). Rather than replacing the capability as in
the case of substitution, or modifying existing capability in a path-dependent manner as in the
6
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case of evolution, transformation seeks to develop new capability by modifying some routines,
discarding others, and acquiring new ones.
The next section outlines the methods used in our multi-level study of digital capability
gaps in the area of car navigation. Thereafter, we demonstrate why automakers’ traditional
approaches to modularity are challenged as a result of increased diversity of technological
options and increased differentiation of firm capabilities on the navigation market. We then
present a case study of an automaker that transformed their approach to modularity by
incorporating software perspectives on modularity to close the capability gap perceived relative
to new types of competitors. Lastly, we discuss implications of our research for the innovation
literature and outline a perspective on how to understand digital innovation in a product
developing setting.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We report a multi-level study (Klein et al. 1999; Hitt et al. 2007) of car navigation
technology to understand (1) why automakers’ traditional approaches to modularity in product
design and organization design are challenged by new digital options and (2) how automakers
reconfigure these approaches to leverage new digital options as part of their innovations. This
reporting is based on case study research conducted at a car manufacturer, CarCorp, and its
owner, GlobalCarCorp.
CarCorp is a manufacturing firm that produces, markets, and sells around 125,000 cars
per year primarily in Europe and the U.S. CarCorp is a fully owned subsidiary of a major global
vehicle manufacturer, GlobalCarCorp. The number of employees at the main production plant of
CarCorp was 4,500 in 2007. Concurrent with GlobalCarCorp’s attempts to streamline their
global business, which includes many other brands, CarCorp’s business functions are tightly
integrated with GlobalCarCorp’s global organization. While many areas of R&D have been relocated within the global firm to avoid redundancy, navigation technology as part of its larger
R&D domain, infotainment, is one R&D area for which CarCorp has been attributed significant
global responsibility.
Contextualized within a longitudinal study that was initiated in 2002, the research on
modularity and capability-building in digital innovation was concentrated to a three-year period
between 2006 and 2008. In addition to our intensive involvement as researchers into CarCorp’s
design practices (Walsham 2006), we complemented the resulting in-depth understanding of
navigation technology at the firm level with a content analysis study on the industry-level
(Krippendorff 2004). Hence, the presented case study is based on multiple data collection
methods including interviewing, participant observation, project document analysis, as well as
analysis of industry-related secondary data such as press releases, trade press articles, and reports
of navigation technology analysts. In what follows, we describe the methods used for the firmlevel and industry-level analyses.
Firm-Level Analysis
The firm-level analysis focused on CarCorp and GlobalCarCorp’s R&D activities in the
car infotainment area with a special focus on navigation technology. It addressed how CarCorp
reconfigured its approach to modularity to better leverage from new digital technology. Given
the institutionalized innovation patterns following long-established product architectures in the
automotive industry (Abernathy 1978; Nevins and Whitney 1989), such reconfiguration
represents an unusual event that breaks with the industry’s received understanding of product
7

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

innovation. In addition to the suggestion that a single case study is useful when the purposes of
the study are revelatory (Yin 2009), we reasoned that intensive research would be suitable for
detailed tracing of such breaking with the past.
When producing knowledge about a complex phenomenon an insider perspective is
preferable (Van de Ven 2007). This entails an open-ended and inductive mode of inquiry where
knowledge is derived in an emergent manner over time without a priori guidance of a particular
theoretical framework (Mason 2002). Over time, inductive reasoning yields patterns of action
that stabilize as opportunities for theorizing that can be related to existing research streams.
While the data should tell the story in qualitative studies (cf. Wolcott 2001), multiple and equally
valid stories can co-exist in a rich data material collected through inductive reasoning. Hence,
our story of modularity and capability gaps during digital innovation at CarCorp complements a
previous one focusing on automotive designers as path creators (Henfridsson et al. 2009).
The main data collection methods used throughout the firm-level study included
interviewing, participant observation, and project document analysis. This data was collected
through three consecutive R&D projects at CarCorp. First, we conducted 65 interviews during
2006 and 2008. Our respondents came primarily from CarCorp and GlobalCarCorp but also from
automotive suppliers, competitors, consultancy organizations, mobile device manufacturers, and
mobile network operators that were engaged in infotainment projects at CarCorp. Using a
snowball approach (Knoke et al. 2008), we interviewed individuals from different ranks of the
automaker, including automotive engineers, product managers, departmental managers, and
electrical engineering directors. Interviewees came from a variety of functions, including
advanced engineering, marketing, software and control, infotainment, telematics, and R&D.
Since GlobalCarCorp is one of the Big Three automakers with operations around the world,
respondents had different nationalities and were primarily interviewed on-site in both Europe and
North America.
Another important source of data is the significant volume of archival data including
system specifications, reports, strategies, and sales forecasts related to the R&D projects covered.
For the purposes of this study, the complete set of system specifications and analyses produced
and documented throughout the study period have been an invaluable source for tracing changes
in product architecture and approach to modularity. Apart of being boundary objects for informal
discussion with CarCorp practitioners in situ, they have provided solid documentation for
reconstructing the details of modular change that took place. All in all, this documentation
consists of more than 30 reports recorded in different versions. Lastly, participant observation
was a valuable data source. We participated in more than 30 meetings related to developments of
the product architecture for in-car navigation. In addition to these project meetings, we
conducted frequent visits at various sites of CarCorp and their partners.
Following the suggestions of Charmaz (2006), we repeatedly read and coded the data to
identify key themes from major events, activities, and technology choices. We soon identified
the tension between physical and logical design perspectives as a major theme of interest. As
suggested above, this tension congealed as an opportunity for iterating between the modularity
literature and our empirical observations at CarCorp to develop a new theoretical perspective on
modularity. During this process, we discovered that practitioner perceptions and project
documentation could not fully account for the external pressures of digital innovation with
regard to navigation technology. We therefore decided to design an industry-level analysis to fill
that void in our analysis.
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Industry-Level Analysis
To increase our understanding of why digital options challenged the understanding of
modularity at CarCorp in the area of car navigation technology, a content analysis (Krippendorff
2004) was conducted at the industry-level. Our in-depth study gave us an understanding of the
pressures perceived by CarCorp employees and their associated business partners. The content
analysis was intended to complement that understanding with a theory-informed analysis focused
on options diversity and capability differentiation (Schilling 2000) as indicators of pressure to
increase the modularization of navigation technology.
The content analysis was conducted as a process study (Langley 1999). The analysis was
geared towards activities, events, and decisions of relevance to the development of navigation
technology and related innovations. The analysis hence manifests an understanding of “process
as developmental event sequence” (Van de Ven 1992). Based on the firm-level analysis, we
already had a well-grounded suspicion that new digital options related to car navigation had
emerged over the last years. However, we did not have a detailed account of the diverging
technology options for realizing basic navigation functionality such as positioning, route
calculation, and user interface. In addition, we wanted to understand the increases in possible
navigation system functionality. We considered the adoption of new technologies within the
industry as a key indicator of increased capability differentiation. Moreover, we identified new
business relationships with industry partners that normally would not cooperate in the
development of embedded navigation technology.
We first gathered data from trade press publications such as Telematics Update and
Automotive News to develop an initial understanding of the topic area. This data collection
confirmed the existence of three fundamental navigation technology options: embedded solution,
portable device, and online service. We then identified main players for each of the options and
focused on TomTom and Appello as leading actors of the two navigation technology options
competing with the automakers’ embedded solution. All publicly available press releases and
company information of these firms were then collected and recorded in our research database.
All in all, this summoned up to a total of 282 data items, comprising 464 pages of text, that were
used to generate a close examination of why digital options challenge the received understanding
of modularity in the area of car navigation technology.
Content analysis is about developing results from texts. Among different ways of
defining the units to be recorded and analyzed (Krippendorff 2004), we adopted categorical
distinctions as the basis for conducting our data analysis. Categorical distinctions “define units
by their membership in a class or category” (2004, p. 105). Categories distinguished in our
analysis included functionality, complementary assets, business partnerships, and product
releases. These categories emerged in the iteration between the theoretical conceptions “options
diversity” and “capability differentiation” and the data collected.
OPTIONS DIVERSITY AND CAPABILITY DIFFERENTIATION IN CAR
NAVIGATION TECHNOLOGY
Seeking to address why new digital options challenged modularity practices at
GlobalCarCorp, this section presents our industry-level analysis of the evolution of navigation
technology over a five-year period (2004-2009). The resulting story documents increasing
options diversity and capability differentiation (Schilling 2000) among key players on the car
navigation market through a detailed account of activities, events, and decisions related to three
9
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fundamental navigation technology options (embedded solution, portable device, and online
navigation). Summarized in Table 1, we describe the diverse characteristics of each of these
options. We conclude the section by discussing the capability gap automakers face in relation to
navigation technology and the resulting pressure to reconfigure their current approach to
modularity and innovation control.
Option
Embedded
Solution

Description
Integrated into
car dashboard,
interconnected
with other incar systems

Industry
Automotive

Design
Car-centric

Portable
Device
(Exemplar
TomTom)

Single-purpose
device, portable
across different
contexts

Consumer
electronics

Device-centric

On-line
Service
(Exemplar
Appello)

Server-based
application,
available across
a portfolio of
devices

Telecom,
Internet

Service-centric

Strengths
- Integrated
interface
- Look-and-feel
- Ease-of-use
- High-precision
positioning
- High computing
specificity
- Low price
- Portability
- Dedicated
interface
- Ease-of-use
- High computing
specificity

- Low price
- Map update
- Functionality
update
- Device
independence

Limitations
- High price
- Map update
- Functionality
update
- Weak support
- Car dependency
- Map update
- Functionality
update
- Interface
integration
- Positioning
precision
- Single-purpose
- Device
dependency
- Connectivity
dependency
- Limited interface
- Network provider
coverage
- Positioning
precision
- Low computing
specificity
- Device
compatibility

Table 1: Fundamental options for car navigation.
Embedded Solution Option
Until 2004, car navigation was dominated by embedded solutions offered by automakers
in top-end car models. Such solutions are location-based applications for route guidance. They
are integrated into the car dashboard and interconnected with other in-car systems such as
steering wheel controls, loudspeakers, and displays (see Figure 1).

10
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Embedded solution
Portable device
Figure 1: Three navigation technology options.

Online service

There is some controversy over when car navigation was first offered for commercial use,
but Akerman (2006) suggests Honda Legend in 1990 as the first car equipped with navigation
technology. By the time the US government provided a more accurate GPS-signal for
commercial use in 2000, most automakers offered embedded navigation solutions, typically
building on the systems provided by tier-1 suppliers such as Denso, Harman Becker, and
Siemens VDO. While the penetration rate has been relatively low over the years, the profit
margin on embedded navigation solutions has been high.
The primary strength of the embedded solution from a customer’s point-of-view is its
integrated interface based on in-car resources such as steering wheel controls, loudspeaker
system, and screens. As suggested by JD Power’s biannual “navigation usage and satisfaction
management reports”, the embedded solution option also rates high on look-and-feel and easeof-use. Moreover, the interconnection with other in-car systems allows for the use of dead
reckoning for increasing positioning precision beyond GPS.
However, the synergetic specificity of the embedded solution comes with a high customer
price and significant inertia. Tied to the car, functionality and map updates of the system are not
only expensive and slow. They can be unattainable because of the dependency on other car
systems. In addition, automakers’ support organizations have generally insufficient expertise in
navigation systems compared to traditional subsystems of the car such as engine and
transmission.
These downsides of the embedded navigation option paved the way for alternative
technology options that are personal rather than integrated into the car. In fact, sales figures in
Europe (see Figure 2) demonstrate that automakers were losing this market to personal
navigation systems during 2004-2006 (cf. Hart and McClure 2006). Today, there are two
different personal navigation options: portable device and online service.
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Figure 2: Sales of navigation systems. (source: Canalys)
Blue line: personal navigation; purple line: embedded navigation
Portable Device Option
The first low-cost alternative to challenge embedded solutions was portable device
navigation (see Figure 1). The primary strength of the portable device option is its low price
compared to the embedded solution. In addition, its ease-of-use, portability, and dedicated
interface are typically suggested to be qualities contributing to the recent market success. Similar
to the embedded solution, however, functionality and map updates stand out as limitations of the
portable device. The interface integration with other car functions is poor and positioning relies
on GPS-technology only. Lastly, the implementation of this option as a single-purpose, standalone, device increases the number of devices in users’ everyday life.
As a key example, TomTom Navigator was first launched in 2002 as a software solution
running on selected Portable Digital Assistants (PDA) equipped with external GPS receivers.
With the subsequent launch of TomTom Go in March 2004, the firm paved the way for
dedicated and portable navigation devices. Virtually abandoning the PDA-based option, the “allin-one navigation device” equipped with touch-screen technology and built-in GPS receiver
attracted new consumers that valued the low price for an easy-to-use navigator. As a result,
TomTom’s sales sky-rocketed in 2005 (720 € millions) with a 375% increase over the previous
year (192 € millions). This success attracted many other players into the market for portable
navigation devices. In fact, between 2004 and 2005, the number of portable navigation suppliers
doubled, from 15 to 30 (Hart and McClure 2006). Already at this time, portable navigation
devices had dramatically surpassed the embedded solution market in terms of sold units (see
Figure 2).
In response to this competitive pressure, a set of automakers developed partnerships with
portable navigation providers to offer joint solutions. As early as in March 2005, TomTom
announced that Opel Corsa would be equipped with “play and go-navigation”, where the
TomTom Go-device was fitted into the dashboard of the car and supplied with power from the
car. Agreements with automakers such as Fiat, Lancia, Nissan, and Volkswagen followed,
manifesting new forms of industry spanning alliances on the navigation market.
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Online Service Option
Stimulated by the success of the portable device, another navigation technology option
emerged: the online service (see Figure 1). Online navigation services run on cell phones and are
either offered by mobile network operators through subscription plans or sold directly by the
navigation service provider. The primary strengths of the online service option are its low price
and device independence. In addition, functionality and map updates are conveniently handled
by the service provider. Depending on mobile network coverage, however, online service use is
limited to the coverage provided by the operator providing the service. In addition, the cell phone
interface is obviously limited in the car setting because of its small size and limited user input
techniques.
As a key example, Appello launched Wisepilot as “the first complete navigation system
for cell phones” in 2004. Wisepilot provided clients (i.e. cell phones) an online navigation
service with critical functions, such as routing and map database, hosted on a server, and
accessible on-line through network technology. With this client-server architecture, clients can
be relatively thin (i.e. with little local software) and make use of object oriented software such as
Java to access software service located on the server. An immediate and important benefit of this
architecture is easy maintenance. Appello can update maps, routing, and other complementary
services on the server and thereby making them immediately available on all clients. As a result,
the navigation service will always be based on the most recent version of maps and navigation
functionality.
In 2005, Appello signed a license contract with TeliaSonera about making Wisepilot the
basis of an online navigation service called Telia Navigator. Similar deals were signed with a
multitude of mobile network providers over the following two years. In late 2006, Appello was
approached by CarCorp for participating in a R&D project with the intention to develop a
platform for in-car online navigation. Over the next 12 months, Appello participated in the
project, which resulted in three “strategies for wireless integration of Appello's mobile online
navigation service WISEPILOT® into a vehicle environment” (Appello press release, January
18, 2008).
Summary of Industry Level Analysis
Our analysis revealed three fundamental technology options for car navigation. The
commercial and technical advances of the portable device and online navigation options
document why the embedded navigation technology option at CarCorp and other automakers
was challenged. As proposed by Schilling (2000), such increased options diversity will likely
lead to increased inter-firm modularity to facilitate partnerships. It is therefore not surprising that
several car manufacturers engaged in joint ventures with TomTom as early as 2005 and CarCorp
later in 2006 engaged with Appello in a joint R&D project. These responses resulted from the
increased capability differentiation among the players on the navigation market. As firms such as
TomTom and Appello took increased leadership over navigation technology in the years 20042006, it was clear that GlobalCarCorp and other automakers needed to adopt new approaches to
car navigation, but in doing so they faced a serious capability gap. Next section deals with
CarCorp’s attempts to close this gap by reconfiguring their approach to modularity.
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MODULARITY RECONFIGURED AT CARCORP
Embedded navigation solutions are developed, implemented, sourced, and maintained by
automakers based on a traditional approach to modularity and hierarchical control over the
innovation process. In this way, automakers can secure the final design as an integrated, yet
separable, part of the car as a product and they can align the design of navigation systems to the
product development processes of specific car models.
One significant motive for designing a navigation system as an integrated, yet distinct,
part of a car concerns product differentiation. In CarCorp’s case, navigation systems are sold as
options. Rather than selling navigation as standard equipment, these systems serve as a
differentiator included in more exclusive editions of the car model1. Such differentiation enables
customization of the car and it increases the profit margin2. Another motive is that modularized
parts can be shared by other functions of the car. For instance, the screen used for embedded
navigation in a modern car such as those of CarCorp is increasingly used as interface to the audio
system.
Moreover, this traditional approach to modularization is also manifested in the
organization design with important implications for how the overall product development
process can be managed and coordinated. The process at GlobalCarCorp (and therefore also
CarCorp) is based on a stage-gated process where modularization is essential to determine
progress in development projects and secure that parallel development of the multitude of parts
eventually will aggregate into a well-functioning car. First, stage-gates are implemented as
review meetings where results and timelines are evaluated. Deviations may result in project
termination or that resources are adjusted to speed up the process, kept intact, or reallocated to
projects in need. Modularization facilitates such meetings by clearly separating concerns
between different parts of the car, the infotainment system, or the navigation system under
development. Second, the stage-gated process also facilitates project coordination. For instance,
a navigation project must early on determine which information it needs from other parts of the
car (e.g., the braking system) so that development activities can be coordinated (e.g., engineers
working on braking systems make gyro and wheel pulse information available in the correct
format). Such early binding of interface requirements between different parts of the car also
allows sourcing processes to be initiated. Since most components in a car are sourced to tier-1
suppliers, the management of supplier relationships is essential to automakers and effective
modularization enable the definition of scope in sourcing.
Figures 3 and 4 describe the typical modularization of an embedded navigation solution3.
Figure 3 depicts the logical view of a navigation system including core functionality such as map
rendering, routing, and guidance. Each sub-function inherits (downward arrow) features from
one or more functions on the higher level and the resulting logical architecture is therefore a
network rather than a hierarchy. The lowest layer of the diagram depicts various physical sensors
used for feeding the system with dynamic data and each of the lowest level functions therefore
aggregate (upward arrow) data from one or more sensors. For instance, guidance is a core
1

However, navigation is often bundled with other luxurious infotainment functionality. For instance, the navigation
system sold as an option in CarCorp’s midsized car on the US market in 2009 is bundled with a more advanced
audio and stereo system.
2
It is well-known that features sold as options can be priced higher than features sold as standard equipment.
3
To date, the exact architecture varied within GlobalCarCorp. The chief infotainment software architect estimated
that the global automaker had around 15 different navigation suppliers in 2007. The process described in this paper
was part of harmonizing architectures across brands and regions to gain economics of scale and reduce complexity.
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functionality of a navigation system that draws on map matching, a map database, information
about the active route, and traffic information. In turn, map matching is an algorithm that
matches the vehicle position with the map data. Vehicle position is a function that draws on a
satellite sub-function and brake sub-function. These latter sub-functions interpret data collected
from sensors.
While the logical view provides a functional view of different modules of a navigation
system, these functions are typically implemented as distinct software modules allocated to
different physical parts of the system. This allocation varies between car models. However, a
common feature of the physical view of virtually any existing system is its hierarchical design.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the infotainment master controls the navigation (hardware) node, the
traffic information mode, the satellite navigation node, and the brake node. In addition, it
manages the display, speakers, and user controls.

Figure 3: Logical view of a modularized embedded navigation solution.
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Figure 4: Physical view of a modularized embedded navigation solution.
Whether approached from a logical or a physical perspective, modularity, as practiced at
CarCorp and GlobalCarCorp, built on a hierarchical product architecture where the automaker
designs the main node and its interfaces. For instance, control of the infotainment node and the
HMI software enables CarCorp to manage the system’s appearance to customers. CarCorp
defines the detailed functional and non-functional (e.g., temperature range) requirements and the
specific ways in which users can interact with the navigation system. Based on such detailed
specifications, the navigation node is sourced to tier-1 suppliers, which bundles routing and
guidance features into one dedicated solution that can be effectively integrated into the car.
Responding to New Options
As late as in 2004, CarCorp’s approach to the new emerging technology options, portable
device and online navigation, was dominated by attempts to fine-tune the embedded solution.
CarCorp still considered embedded navigation superior of other options both in terms of
functionality and look-and-feel (cf. Table 1). It was therefore not surprising that one of the early
R&D projects on car integration of portable devices such as cell phones and PDAs focused on
enhancing the embedded solution option rather than on exploring possible collaboration projects.
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For instance, it was investigated how phone address book data could be used to facilitate user
input of guidance information. One use scenario described how calendar entries in the cell phone
were used as input to the route guidance function. This feature would facilitate entering of
address information into the navigation system for, e.g., a sales man driving to a customer
meeting. When she connected her cell phone to the car system, the embedded system would
automatically pick up the address as destination.
In view of the tremendous success of portable devices, however, the year 2006 marked a
significant change in CarCorp’s thinking about navigation and technology options. One early
sign was serious consideration about what it takes to compete on a market characterized by
options diversity. A chief software architect commented:
You need to provide the customer with added value for making him purchase a more advanced system in the car. On
top of being at least as good as what exists on the market, you need to keep up with all new that is coming along.
[...] Already today you can buy a cell phone with navigation [online service]. There are a lot of options out there
that we don’t offer and you can update after a year and download cool features. We are currently in a situation
where indentifying a nice way of integrating with the car is necessary to match what can be found elsewhere.
Typically, it costs significantly more when we do it because our low economy-of-scale compared to TomTom’s
navigation devices pushed out in millions of units.

Gradually realizing the market success of alternatives to embedded navigation and
noticing other automakers’ collaboration initiatives with TomTom (e.g., Fiat, Lancia, Opel,
Nissan, and Volkswagen), increasing attention was paid to the problems of keeping up with the
functionality expansion and diversity offered by the two personal navigation technology options.
Typically, the differences between automotive industry practices on one hand, and consumer
electronics and telecom industry practices on the other hand, dominated when designers and
managers at CarCorp and GlobalCarCorp discussed the increasing capability gap. An
infotainment manager provided an illustrative comment:
The most obvious reason why we have not responded to the market shift is related to the product life cycle
differences between the industries. Traditionally we have operated separately but now when we are forced to
coexist, it is clear that the automotive industry is pretty slow compared to those working with consumer devices.
This is a huge problem. The product development cycle of car products is around 3 to 4 years, while on the device
side it is around 6 months. Before we have even completed half our product development time, they have completed
the entire product life cycle. And this causes significant problems, problems that emerged already when we tried to
integrate cell phone functionality a few years back.

With an increased understanding of the problems facing automakers, infotainment
managers and designers were gradually making sense of the nature and profile of the capability
gap and forming a vision for how to overcome it. In doing so, the capability gap was typically
traced to the existing modular architecture. In particular, the difficulty to flexibly responding to
new emerging user requirements was associated with current ways of tightly integrating
hardware and software and navigation systems features with other car parts. An infotainment
R&D manager, who later became the project manager of an upcoming platform project
explained:
Our systems are not designed for this today. They are very inflexible. If you want to put something into production, it
takes three years, almost regardless of what it is. So, if we could get away from a hardware solution, we might
address the problem of long lead times for introducing new functionality in the car. […] The hardware used should
remain the same over time, while the software modules should enable the adaptation needed.
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As noted by this R&D manager, the existing infotainment architecture, including the
navigation system, could not accommodate flexible adoption of new features over time because
embedded solutions are inherently inflexible when it comes to functionality and map updates (cf.
Figure 1). As a result, CarCorp embarked on a new infotainment platform project in 2006 in
which navigation was at the center of attention. At this point, earlier disappointing attempts to
predict future requirements and push promising functionality into the traditional stage-gated
product development process triggered a totally new approach to navigation technology
development. The chief software architect reasoned about what this turn around would require in
terms of design and modularity:
We need to develop a software platform in the car that provides opportunities for SonyEricsson, Nokia, or other
players to develop third-party applications. We have got many generic in-car resources that can be attractive [for
such application developers]. I am convinced that you don’t win this game by doing all things yourself. We don’t
know what’s best in three years. We should rather look at the actors who are successful and encourage them to
develop on our platform and earn jointly from such a process.

Accordingly, CarCorp invited a number of different firms including Appello and
SonyEricsson to participate in the new R&D project with the purpose of developing generic
solutions that would allow more flexible adoption of infotainment technology beyond the
traditional hierarchy of modularity and control. Given their online navigation service expertise,
Appello was invited. A key account manager at Appello commented:
I think that the automakers are desperate to accomplish a paradigm change for navigation. They increasingly
recognize that they are losing the game. I don’t know their sales figures exactly but they see that other players
occupy more and more of the market space and that they must do something. The embedded systems are too
expensive and they [CarCorp] view this project as an opportunity to get some guidance, to know what they need to
change and what opportunities to exploit.

As CarCorp had no previous collaboration experience with online service providers, the
project was difficult to benchmark and it was primarily seen as an exploratory effort to develop
new patterns of generic solutions that would be evaluated in terms of feasibility for both parties.
The CEO of Appello noted:
We own very up-to-date technology for telecom-based navigation and telecom-based services. [...]However, no one
knows what the best solution is [when integrating online navigation with cars] and we want to explore which
technology configuration is best. [...] We want to test the potential by exploring different options, to acquire the
flexibility we are looking for. We think we know what’s best, but it needs to be assessed before instantiating a
solution.

Exploring Patterns and Platforms
As a result of inviting Appello as a project partner, the boundary condition for CarCorp’s
platform project was to apply an online navigation pattern as a basis for exploring new patterns
of integrating (rather than embedding) navigation software into the car. The online pattern is a
generic solution for providing navigation based on a client-service architecture. Appello’s
Wisepilot application is an instantiation of the online pattern (recall that Table 1 provided an
overview of its strengths and limitations).
Concurring with the observation of Appello’s CEO, project participants therefore spent
considerable time exploring integration patterns that would augment the inherited properties of
the generic online navigation pattern in different ways. Three patterns – streaming, host, and
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hybrid – were developed on the basis of the online pattern and analyses of available
technological options. Figure 5 depicts how these patterns relate to each other in a modular
architecture. For instance, the hybrid pattern inherits properties of the host pattern, which in turn
inherits properties of the online pattern.

Figure 5: Modularity of navigation solutions based on patterns
Table 2 summarizes these patterns based on a simplified template for specification of
software patterns (cf. Gamma et al. 1993) that highlights key characteristics and main
differences.
Streaming Pattern
Augments the online
pattern by enabling
external control of the
navigation solution
through streaming.

Host Pattern
Augments the online
pattern by porting the
navigation solution to the
in-car software platform.

Hybrid Pattern
Augments the host pattern by
reallocating computing and
storage resources between the
server and the in-car software
platform.

Motivation

The user can control the
online service through incar resources, such as
screens, speaker system,
and steering wheel
buttons.

The service is truly
integrated with the car. In
addition, the user can make
service hand-over to the
cell phone, and vice versa.

The service is truly integrated
in the car but augmented with
capabilities that reduce the
dependency on connectivity.

Applicability

This low-level integration
of navigation software
into the car offers lowcost, car-integrated
navigation that inherits

This high-level integration
of navigation software into
the car exhibits the
advantages of embedded
navigation and adds the

This hybrid integration of
navigation software into the
car exhibits the advantages of
embedded navigation and adds
the advantages of map and

Intent
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some of the advantages
and disadvantages of the
online service pattern.

advantages of map and
functionality updates of the
online service pattern.
However, it also exhibits
the disadvantages related
to connectivity and
network provider
coverage.

functionality updates of the
online service pattern with
significant reduction of the
connectivity issues. However,
the disadvantage related to
network provider coverage
remains.

Implementation

Open standards such as
the AMI-C, Bluetooth,
and SVG protocols enable
in-car interface control of
the online service.

The client-side application
is ported to the car
platform. The Bluetooth
protocol is used to connect
and deploy the cell phone
as communication link to
the server.

Examples

CarCorp’s platform
project implemented the
pattern in a test vehicle
demonstrated for
GlobalCarCorp
executives.

CarCorp’s platform project
implemented the pattern in
a test vehicle demonstrated
for GlobalCarCorp
executives.

The client-side application is
ported to the car platform and
extended with computing and
storage capacity to enable
local routing and limited map
caching. The Bluetooth
protocol is used to connect
and deploy the cell phone as
communication link to the
server.
.
After assessments on a test
platform, CarCorp designers
decided not to implement the
pattern in a test vehicle.

Table 2: Patterns of integrating online navigation software into the car at CarCorp
First, the streaming pattern is a generic solution for augmenting the online pattern with a
remote control function. The remote control function enables user manipulation of the online
service via in-car resources such as screens, steering wheel buttons, and the speaker system. This
low-level integration of navigation software into the car offers low-cost, car-integrated
navigation that inherits some of the advantages of the online service pattern. In particular, it
inherits the advantage of always using the latest versions of functionality and maps. In addition,
it offers low-cost car integration that outperforms the online service pattern when it comes to the
limited interface of the cell phone. However, the other disadvantages of the online service pattern
including connectivity dependence and network provider coverage are also inherited since the
core functionality runs on the cell phone.
Second, the host pattern is a generic solution for augmenting the embedded navigation
option with a consumer device-based communication link. The communication link enables a
navigation solution based on the most recent version of navigation functionality and maps.
Moreover, it enables seamless transitions between in-car and device navigation for sustained
service across contexts (cf. Henfridsson and Lindgren 2005). While it exhibits the advantages of
the embedded navigation option, it also inherits the connectivity dependence and network
provider coverage disadvantages of the online service option.
Finally, the hybrid pattern is a generic solution for augmenting the embedded navigation
option without inheriting the connectivity dependence disadvantage of the online service option.
This hybrid integration of navigation software into the car has the advantages of embedded
navigation and adds the advantage of up-to-date maps and functionality of the online service
option without inheriting the disadvantages related to connectivity. However, the network
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provider coverage disadvantage is still inherited since the online service depends on the coverage
provided by the mobile network subscription selected by the user.
Towards a New Understanding of Modularity
Understanding components as patterns rather than as parts represented a new way of
developing navigation systems at CarCorp. As outlined above, the development of these patterns
for integrating online navigation software into the car clarified options for CarCorp and
GlobalCarCorp infotainment managers and designers. The joint project with Appello gave
important and detailed insights into the online service option and pattern. It suggested that
blending the embedded solution and the online service could be a feasible way forward. As the
key account manager at Appello noted:
Talking about hybrid solutions [referring to all three patterns], this is a step towards more open thinking, a step
towards the unknown world of mixing embedded and online navigation.

To further assess each pattern, CarCorp decided to implement them on a test platform
before deploying them in an actual car. This evaluated showed that the streaming and host
patterns were the most promising options. The connectivity dependency was considered a
temporary disadvantage, and the hybrid pattern was therefore not considered useful because of
significant additional development costs.
However, even with the promising results, CarCorp realized that implementing the
streaming and host patterns would not overcome the capability gap caused by the existing
modular architecture. As stated earlier by the project manager and the chief software architect,
CarCorp needed to accommodate changing requirements through flexible software
configurations. This required a shift away from emphasizing complete specification of
requirements towards development of an infotainment platform that could support a portfolio of
different navigation solutions. As the project manager explained:
The biggest difference is that we [in the project] are turning around the entire issue. We have realized that we
cannot define all future services that people will desire. This is probably not our job at all.

With this recognition as a basis, the platform project was geared towards the creation of
subsystems and interfaces that facilitate the participation of actors who would be able to define
and develop such future services over time in GlobalCarCorp’s R&D. Because the navigation
patterns generated clearly suggested that such participation would go beyond the traditional
supplier relationship, the platform needed to be harmonized with technologies used by the
consumer device and telecom industries. In fact, the online pattern that formed the basis for the
project was outside CarCorp’s control. Personal navigation actors such as Appello control
requirements determination and therefore also the set of technologies used.
The implications for automakers were underlined by one of CarCorp’s key consultants in
the project, who had considerable working experience at one of CarCorp’s competitors. He noted
that:
Clearly, the most important issue is to avoid selecting technology that is automotive-specific and get stuck in the
world of automobiles. We must select technology that exits in the world of nomadic devices because then the time
difference problem is virtually eliminated. […] You cannot have a typical auto operating system such as QNX. Then
it is difficult, because you have to develop drivers and all sorts of software that you would get without effort
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otherwise. I believe that flexibility ... functionality should be developed somewhere else. This problem requires other
types of suppliers, which participate and promotes flexibility.

The adoption of consumer electronics and telecom technologies was considered important
to facilitate porting of applications and services developed. This would enable more agile and
flexible development and not least pave the way for implementing appropriate incentive
structures for outside developers. The vehicle architecture, platform interface, and technology
strategy work packages of the project therefore suggested a software platform based on Linux
and a Java Virtual Machine. The platform dramatically lowered the barrier for adopting new
technology options and patterns.
Over a series of demonstrations of the instantiated streaming and host patterns to
GlobalCarCorp executives, as well as a successful gate stage meeting at towards the end of the
project, the support for the infotainment platform idea increased significantly at the automaker.
Accordingly, a new follow-up project was sanctioned and initiated. The project would develop
the new product development process that would leverage from the new software platform. To
realize new forms of modularity that support external firms to develop new requirements and
applications for navigation, the organization design needed to reflect the new product
architecture. The consultant responsible for the software platform highlighted this need but also
noted its complexity:
This [redesign the organization to reflect the platform] is the major problem. People at electrical engineering
departments are used to think about how to embed and control more functionality. This is in their own interest. The
electrical engineering department, with say 20 people working on infotainment and 20 people working in telematics,
is geared towards specifying in-car functionality so that their own organization becomes more important. [...] This
is a matter of short-term survival.

DISCUSSION
In this paper, we investigate how digital innovation presents new options and threats to
automakers. In particular, we focus on modularity as a dynamic capability and its changing role
when digital technologies are becoming increasingly embedded in traditionally non-digital
products. To this end, we trace why the traditional approaches to modularity in product design
and organization design are challenged when automakers face new digital options, and we
describe how these traditional approaches can be reconfigured to leverage from new digital
options. Seemingly stuck in the industrial society, new knowledge about these issues is vital for
automakers that attempt to close existing capability gaps and redefine their current innovation
path.
On the basis of our case study research across multiple levels (Klein et al. 1999; Hitt et al.
2007), we extend the innovation literature by identifying and characterizing a capability gap that
product developing firms in traditional industries face if they merely accommodate digital
technology within the confines of current approaches to modularity. The content analysis
(Krippendorff 2004) of navigation technology demonstrated an increasing degree of technology
options diversity and firm capability differentiation, both of which are proposed to be positively
related to increased inter-firm modularity in the literature (Schilling 2000). Sales figures and
perceptions of CarCorp and GlobalCarCorp employees indicate that the changes in options
diversity and capability differentiation contributed to a rapidly growing capability gap between
needed capabilities and the firm’s existing capability base for competing on the car navigation
market (cf. Capron and Mitchell 2009). We trace this capability gap to the traditional approach to
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modularity among automakers, which cannot accommodate digital technologies in a sufficiently
responsive and distributed way (Yoo et al. 2008).
In addition, we present a new understanding of modularity that draws on the innovation
literature (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Garud et al. 2003; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Schilling
2000) as well as the software engineering literature (Alexander 1999; Brooks 1987; Dikel et al.
1997; Gamma et al. 1995). Rather than relying mainly on components as interrelated physical
parts of a hierarchical system, we argue that digital innovation requires product developers to
fully exploit physical as well as logical design perspectives, and to differentiate between
components as parts, as patterns, and as platforms. We posit that the capability to combine such
approaches to modularity is essential for effectively embedding digital technology into
traditional physical products. For instance, in view of the perceived capability gap at CarCorp,
designers of navigation technology abandoned some of the established modular principles for the
embedded navigation option. Rather than defining requirements for the navigation solution and
decomposing it into parts for sourcing to suppliers, the use of patterns provided the capability to
envision a number of different configurations in collaboration with Appello. The streaming, host,
and hybrid patterns all represented generic solutions based on the online pattern. Since an online
service never can be a physical part of CarCorp’s solution, the traditional approach to modularity
was at odds with the attempts to integrate navigation software into cars.
The adoption of patterns and platforms as bases for digital innovation at CarCorp
represented a break with the received view of modularity. It was an attempt to reconfigure
capabilities for making the automaker more attuned to the challenges of digital innovation.
Distinguishing between substitution, evolution, and transformation as different forms of
capability configuration (Lavie 2006), it can be noted that CarCorp’s new approach to
modularity cannot be considered as substitution. It goes without saying that an automaker still
manufactures physical products, which suggests that decomposition into physical parts will
remain important for effectively addressing the hardware side of digital innovation.
However, it is too early to determine if the reconfiguration of modularity at CarCorp is
best described as evolution or transformation. Clearly, the platform project initiated in 2006
marked the beginning of a more substantial transformation of modularity practices. Yet, previous
research on path creation in digital innovation shows that the creation of new innovation paths is
demanding in institutionalized settings and embroiled in tensions and contradictions
(Henfridsson et al. 2009). Thus, it would be unfortunate not to accommodate the last words of
the CarCorp consultant expressing doubts about the firm’s capacity to accomplish a swift
transformation of both the organizational design and product design in a concerted manner.
At the same time, some of the big unknowns relate to what type of industrial players and
technology options will continue to emerge in the car navigation space given the dynamic nature
of the basic digital technology. New players, such as Google, are already establishing strong
positions in location-based services and it would probably be a mistake not to assume increased
technological diversity on the navigation market.
Implications
The automobile industry was one of the early adopters of modularity (Nevins and
Whitney 1989). Product decomposition supports product change, product variety, component
standardization, product performance, and product development management (Ulrich 1995), all
of which are important aspects for competing successfully on the automobile market. It is
therefore not surprising that our findings confirm earlier research about the central role of
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modularity as an approach to product and organization design during innovation (Baldwin and
Clark 2000; Garud et al. 2003; Langlois 2002; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). The findings also
confirm a number of propositions of Schilling’s (2000) general modular systems theory and its
application to interfirm product modularity. In particular, our study demonstrates how greater
diversity in technology options in the market, as well as how the degree to which firms in the
market have different capabilities, are positively related to increasing interfirm modularity. It
also provides evidence for Schilling’s (2000) proposition that increasing customer heterogeneity
in desired function or scale of product is positively related to increasing interfirm product
modularity. Indeed, it was the emergence of new customer demands of personal and inexpensive
navigation that stimulated CarCorp to initiate collaborative innovation with Appello and
SonyEricsson.
It is equally clear, however, that the increasing role of digital technology in automobiles
challenge some of the established innovation principles of the industry. Our multi-level case
study tracks some of the challenges and our analysis offers a number of significant implications
for the innovation literature on modularity (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Garud et al. 2003; Sanchez
and Mahoney 1996; Schilling 2000) and the emerging innovation network literature on how
digitization triggers new forms of control and coordination (Andersson et al. 2008; Zammuto et
al. 2007; Yoo et al. 2008). First, our analysis shows how automakers’ attempt to close capability
gaps involves an increasing distribution of control and coordination of the innovation
process. CarCorp’s first response to the emergence of the portable device and online service
options was to draw on their established modular architecture. This exploitation of existing
dynamic capability resulted in attempts to enhance the existing embedded option by
incorporating features and content from cell phones. In view of the market success of the
portable device and online service options, however, CarCorp radically transformed their
approach to car navigation by releasing control of the requirements definition. As a result, the
platform project, which started in 2006, adopted a view of modularity that placed patterns and
platform center stage. Grounding the design in an online pattern for integrating navigation
software into the car, the control of the core navigation functionality was attributed to firms with
technological capability in the consumer electronics and telecom domains. CarCorp adopted a
platform strategy to stimulate external innovation by developing a set of software systems and
tools from which derivative services could be generated. This observation confirms Yoo et al.’s
(2008) thesis that innovation in the digital era increasingly involves distribution of control across
innovation networks through cognitive and social translations.
Moreover, we argue that the changing landscape of car navigation technology between
2004 and 2008 in general and within CarCorp in particular cannot be described and explained
based on a traditional simplified notion of modularity and its expressions in relation to product
architectures and related organization designs. The extant product innovation literature on
modularity typically assumes a one-dimensional view of components as parts. This view needs to
be extended to incorporate components as patterns and platforms too. This provides an avenue
for understanding modularity as hierarchy and network at the same time. Looking at how
CarCorp managed to bridge its capability gap, it was new and differentiated notions of
modularity that allowed them to engage in new forms of collaboration with existing and
emerging partners. This is a central observation to recognize when studying and explaining
distributed control and interfirm modularity in digital innovation.
Third, the modularity of digitized artifacts exhibits multiple ontologies. Cars are
physical products that can be conceived as consisting of aggregated parts. As outlined by Brooks
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(1987), software is different than cars because of its complexity, conformity, changeability, and
invisibility. It cannot be understood as aggregated parts alone. Yet, physical parts and software
co-exist in the digital car. This coexistence can take different shapes. Embedded navigation
represents an example where software is tightly coupled to the system as physical part.
Decoupling of the software from the navigation system can only be achieved by orchestrating a
co-existence where patterns and platforms also are used as modular principles in parallel with the
parts’ view. As evidenced in the CarCorp case, this allows for networked forms of interfirm
modularity, where the automaker can inherit properties of the online service option. Yet, the
automaker will still source parts such as electronic control units, screens, speaker systems, and
their software drivers to traditional tier-1 suppliers. The three identified forms of components as
parts, as patterns, and as platforms are distinct. They cannot substitute each other, and they
capture essential properties of digital artifacts.
Finally, as an exemplar of the modularity literature, Schilling (2000) portrays the essence
of modularity as its implementation of adaptability, or dynamic capability, to environmental
pressures, diversity, and heterogeneity. Essentially, Schilling views modularity as the “solution”
to the need of responding to shifting conditions in a firm’s environment. While such adaptability
works within the realm of one form of modularity, we suggest that the Schilling’s notion of
modularity may create limitations to a firm’s capability to adapt in response to increased
digitization of its products. In digital innovation, firms may experience their approach to
modularity as the barrier to effective response to environmental pressure as long as they are not
capable of adopting different forms of modularity including logical perspectives as
complements to the prevailing physical perspectives.
Limitations and Issues for Future Research
Our multi-level case study research involved a number of limitations. First, one limitation
is that we have conducted our study in the automotive industry. The industry is currently
experiencing the culmination of a severe crisis and might be more attentive to potential
capability gaps related to various technologies. Second, we concentrated our analysis on car
navigation technology for understanding modularity and digital innovation. This is an area which
can be considered to be a more likely target for competition from actors of previously unrelated
industries. However, we suggest that this need of reconfiguring modularity as a response to
digital innovation applies to, or will soon apply to, other subsystems of the car as a digital
artifact. As a very senior infotainment engineer at CarCorp noted:
You know, we have software bugs without the customer knowing, and the customer just have to live with that bug
throughout the car’s lifecycle. As long as the engine doesn’t stop, we don’t change it. Only in new product
development [...] And this fact has to do with our way to organize. Something that should be seamless, requires a
workshop visit. [...] Within five years I expect that software updates be done regularly. With wireless
communication, such updates can be done when passing the workshop on the way home from work.

In terms of future research, one suggestion is to replicate our study in other industries
centered on traditionally non-digital artifacts. Taking Jonsson et al.’s (2008) study of the value
proposition of shipboard cranes as an example, it is more than likely that the new remote
diagnostics technology enabling McGregor Cranes to become service providers offers excellent
opportunity to investigate digital innovation and its implications for modularity.
Moreover, other research methodologies can be applied to investigate the options and
threats presented to manufacturing firms. Conducting in-depth research into digital innovation in
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the automotive industry, our investigation has generated a detailed understanding that tracks how
general trends play out in the practice of innovation design and the application of digital
technologies. Future research can conduct, for instance, a cross-sectional survey that uses
econometric methods for generating additional theoretical insights.
CONCLUSION
In the June 2009 issue of the Wired magazine, the Editor-in-Chief, Chris Anderson,
recalls Tom Malone’s 10-year old prediction of the birth of industry ecosystems as an
introduction to Charles Mann’s (2009) article entitled “Beyond Detroit”. Mann proclaims that
“The auto industry must learn to incorporate ideas from outsiders – as the PC industry did 30
years ago”, suggesting that increased inter-firm modularity is essential to “reimagine” the
troubled industry. The same article suggests Baldwin and Clark’s (1997a) work on modularity as
a source of inspiration for promoting the much needed open-ended innovation.
It remains to be seen if this transformation will play out as dramatically in the automotive
industry as it did in the computer industry (Baldwin and Clark 1997b). However, our conviction
is that the capability to build clean, convenient, safe, and inexpensive cars is to a large extent
associated with modularity as an approach to product design and organization design. Our
conviction is also that building that capability for the digital age requires a reconfiguration of
modularity to fit those pockets of innovation where manufacturing meets software.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
VINNOVA funded this research in part.

26

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

REFERENCES
Abernathy, W.J. 1978. The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the Automobile
Industry. John Hopkins Univeristy Press, Baltimore and London.
Akerman, J.R., ed. 2006. Cartographies of Travel and Navigation. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Alexander, C. 1964. Notes on the Synthesis of Form. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Alexander, C. 1979. The Timeless Way of Building. Oxford University Press, New York.
Alexander, C. 1999. The Origins of Pattern Theory: The Future of the Theory, and the
Generation of a Living World. IEEE Software ?(5) 71-82.
Amit, R., P.J.H. Schoemaker. 1993. Strategic Assets and Organizational Rent. Strategic
Management Journal 14(1) 33-46.
Anderson, P., L.M. Tushman. 1990. Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A
Cyclical Model of Technological Change. Administrative Science Quarterly 34(4) 604633.
Andersson, M., R. Lindgren, O. Henfridsson. 2008. Architectural Knowledge in InterOrganizational IT Innovation. Journal of Strategic Information Systems 17(1) 19-38.
Andreasson, L., O. Henfridsson. 2009. Digital Differentiation, Software Product Lines, and the
Challenge of Isomorphism in Innovation: A Case Study Proceedings of ECIS2009.
Baldwin, C.Y., K.B. Clark. 1997a. Managing in an Age of Modularity. Harvard Business Review
75(5) 84-93.
Baldwin, C.Y., K.B. Clark. 1997b. Sun Wars - Competition within a Modular Cluster. D.B.
Yoffie, ed. Competing in the Age of Digital Convergence. Harvard Business School Press,
Boston.
Baldwin, C.Y., K.B. Clark. 2000. Design Rules - The Power of Modularity. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Barabba, V., C. Huber, F. Cooke, N. Pudar, J. Smith, M. Paich. 2002. A Multimethod Approach
for Creating New Business Models: The General Motors OnStar Project. Interfaces 32(1)
20-34.
Bosch, J. 2001. Software Product Lines: Organizational Alternatives Proceedings of the 23rd
International Conference on Software Engineering
Brooks, F.P. 1987. No Silver Bullet: Essence and Accidents of Software Engineering. IEEE
Computer 20(4) 10-19.
Broy, M., I.H. Krüger, A. Pretschner, C. Salzmann. 2007. Engineering Automotive Software.
Proceedings of the IEEE 95(2) 356-373.
Capron, L., W. Mitchell. 2009. Selection Capability: How Capability Gaps and Internal Social
Frictions Affect Internal and External Strategic Renewal. Organization Science 20(2) 294312.
Charmaz, K. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative
Analysis. SAGE Publications, Thousands Oaks, CA.

27

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

Christensen, J.F. 2006. Whither Core Competency for the Large Corporation in an Open
Innovation World? H. Chesbrough, W. Vanhaverbeke, J. West, eds. Open Innovation:
Researching a New Paradigm. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 35-61.
Dikel, D., D. Kane, S. Ornburn, W. Loftus, J. Wilson. 1997. Applying Software Product-Line
Architecture. IEEE Computer 30(8) 49-55.
Gamma, E., R. Helm, R. Johnson, J. Vlissides. 1993. Design Patterns: Abstraction and Reuse of
Object-Oriented Design ECOOP'93 Conference Proceedings: Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer.
Gamma, E., R. Helm, R. Johnson, J. Vlissides. 1995. Design Patterns: Elements of Reusable
Object-Oriented Software. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
Garud, R., A. Kumaraswamy, R.N. Langlois, eds. 2003. Managing in the Modular Age:
Architectures, Networks, and Organizations. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA.
Halman, J.I.M., A.P. Hofer, W. van Vuuren. 2003. Platform-Driven Development of Product
Families: Linking Theory with Practice. Journal of Product Innovation Management 20
149-162.
Hart, A., D. McClure. 2006. Portable Device Integration - Strategies for the Automotive Industry
(Report ref: SBD/TEL/940). SBD: Secured By Design.
Henfridsson, O., R. Lindgren. 2005. Multi-Contextuality in Ubiquitous Computing: Investigating
the Car Case through Action Research. Information and Organization 15(2) 95-124.
Henfridsson, O., Y. Yoo, F. Svahn. 2009. Path Creation in Digital Innovation: A Multi-Layered
Dialectics Perspective. Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Systems, 9(20)
http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-20.
Hitt, M. A., P. W. Beamish, S. E. Jackson, J. E. Mathieu. 2007. Building Theoretical and
Empirical Bridges Across Levels: Multilevel Research in Management. Academy of
Management Journal 50(6) 1385-1399.
Joglekar, N.R., S.R. Rosenthal. 2003. Coordination of Design Supply Chains for Bundling
Physical and Software Products. Journal of Product Innovation Management 20 374-390.
Jonsson, K., U.H. Westergren, J. Holmström. 2008. Technologies for Value Creation: An
Exploration of Remote Diagnostics Systems in the Manufacturing Industry. Information
Systems Journal 18(3) 227-245.
King, J.L., K. Lyytinen. 2004. Automotive Informatics: Information Technology and Enterprise
Transformation in the Automobile Industry. B. Kahin, A. Wycoff, eds. Information
Technology and Enterprise Transformation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Klein, K. J., A. Cannella, H. Tosi. 1999. Multilevel Theory: Challenges and Contributions.
Academy of Management Review 24 243-248.
Krippendorff, K. 2004. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, 2 ed. SAGE
Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Knoke, D., S. Yang. 2008. Social Network Analysis. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Langley, A. 1999. Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data. Academy of Management Review
24(4) 691-710.
28

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

Langlois, R.N. 2002. Modularity in Technology and Organization. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 49 19-37.
Lavie, D. 2006. Capability Reconfiguration: An Analysis of Incumbent Responses to
Technological Change. Academy of Management Review 31(1) 153-174.
Leen, G., D. Heffernan. 2002. Expanding Automotive Electronic Systems. IEEE Computer 35(1)
88-93.
Loewenau, J., J. Angenvoort, K. Mezger. 2007. ADASIS: Real Time Map Information with a
Standardized Interface for Advanced In-Vehicle Applications 6th ITS in Europe Congress
Aalborg, Denmark.
Mann, C.C. 2009. Beyond Detroit. Wired (June) 100-107.
Mason, J. 2002. Qualitative Researching. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks.
Mathiassen, L., A. Munk-Madsen, P.A. Nielsen, J. Stage. 2000. Object Oriented Analysis and
Design. Marko Publishing, Aalborg, Denmark.
Nelson, R.R., S.G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Nevins, J.L., D.E. Whitney, eds. 1989. Concurrent Design of Products and Processes: A
Strategy for the Next Generation in Manufacturing. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Parnas, D.L. 1972. On the Criteria to be Used in Decomposing Systems into Modules.
Communications of the ACM 15(12) 1053-1058.
Pohl, K., G. Böckle, F. van der Linden. 2005. Software Product Line Engineering: Foundations,
Principles, and Techniques. Springer, Berlin.
Ress, C., D. Balzer, A. Bracht, S. Durekovic, J. Löwenau. 2008. ADASIS protocol for advanced
in-vehicle applications Proceedings of the 15th World Congress on Intelligent Transport
Systems, New York, USA.
Robertson, D., K. Ulrich. 1998. Planning for Product Platforms. Sloan Management Review
39(4) 19-31.
Sanchez, R., J.T. Mahoney. 1996. Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in
Product and Organization Design. Strategic Management Journal 17(Winter) 63-76.
Sambamurthy, V., A. Bharadwaj, V. Grover. 2003. Shaping Agility through Digital Options:
Reconceptualizing the Role of Information Technology in Contemporary Firms. MIS
Quarterly 27(2) 237-263.
Schilling, M.A. 2000. Towards a General Modular Systems Theory and its Application to
Interfirm Product Modularity. Academy of Management Review 25(2) 312-334.
Sturgeon, T.J. 2002. Modular Production Networks: a New American Model of Industrial
Organization. Industrial and Corporate Change 11(3) 451-496.
Tushman, L.M., P. Anderson. 1986. Technological Discontinues and Organizational
Environments. Administrative Science Quarterly 31(3) 439-465.
Ulrich, K. 1995. The Role of Product Architecture in the Manufacturing Firm. Research Policy
24(3) 419-440.
Van de Ven, A.H. 1992. Suggestions for Studying Strategy Process: A Research Note. Strategic
Management Journal 13(Summer Special Issue) 169-188.
Van de Ven, A.H. 2007. Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and Social Research.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Walsham, G. 2006. Doing Interpretive Research. European Journal of Information Systems
15(3) 320-330.
Wolcott, H.F. 2001. Writing up Qualitative Research, 2 ed. Sage.
29

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

Yin, R.K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4 ed. SAGE Publications, Thousand
Oaks.
Yoo, Y., K. Lyytinen, R.J. Boland. 2008. Innovation in the Digital Era: Digitization and Four
Classes of Innovation Networks. Working Paper, Temple University.
Yourdon, E., L. L. Constantine. 1979. Structured Design: Fundamentals of a Discipline of
Computer Program and System Design. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River NJ.
Zammuto, R.F., T.L. Griffith, A. Majchrzak, D.J. Dougherty, S. Faraj. 2007. Information
Technology and the Changing Fabric of Organization. Organization Science 18(5) 749-762.

30

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-22

Working Papers on Information Systems | ISSN 1535-6078
Editors:
Michel Avital, University of Amsterdam
Kevin Crowston, Syracuse University
Advisory Board:

Editorial Board:

Kalle Lyytinen, Case Western Reserve University
Roger Clarke, Australian National University
Sue Conger, University of Dallas
Marco De Marco, Universita’ Cattolica di Milano
Guy Fitzgerald, Brunel University
Rudy Hirschheim, Louisiana State University
Blake Ives, University of Houston
Sirkka Jarvenpaa, University of Texas at Austin
John King, University of Michigan
Rik Maes, University of Amsterdam
Dan Robey, Georgia State University
Frantz Rowe, University of Nantes
Detmar Straub, Georgia State University
Richard T. Watson, University of Georgia
Ron Weber, Monash University
Kwok Kee Wei, City University of Hong Kong

Margunn Aanestad, University of Oslo
Steven Alter, University of San Francisco
Egon Berghout, University of Groningen
Bo-Christer Bjork, Hanken School of Economics
Tony Bryant, Leeds Metropolitan University
Erran Carmel, American University
Kieran Conboy, National U. of Ireland Galway
Jan Damsgaard, Copenhagen Business School
Robert Davison, City University of Hong Kong
Guido Dedene, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Alan Dennis, Indiana University
Brian Fitzgerald, University of Limerick
Ole Hanseth, University of Oslo
Ola Henfridsson, Viktoria Institute
Sid Huff, Victoria University of Wellington
Ard Huizing, University of Amsterdam
Lucas Introna, Lancaster University
Panos Ipeirotis, New York University
Robert Mason, University of Washington
John Mooney, Pepperdine University
Steve Sawyer, Pennsylvania State University
Virpi Tuunainen, Helsinki School of Economics
Francesco Virili, Universita' degli Studi di Cassino

Sponsors:
Association for Information Systems (AIS)
AIM
itAIS
Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia
American University, USA
Case Western Reserve University, USA
City University of Hong Kong, China
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark
Hanken School of Economics, Finland
Helsinki School of Economics, Finland
Indiana University, USA
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Lancaster University, UK
Leeds Metropolitan University, UK
National University of Ireland Galway, Ireland
New York University, USA
Pennsylvania State University, USA
Pepperdine University, USA
Syracuse University, USA
University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
University of Dallas, USA
University of Georgia, USA
University of Groningen, Netherlands
University of Limerick, Ireland
University of Oslo, Norway
University of San Francisco, USA
University of Washington, USA
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
Viktoria Institute, Sweden

Managing Editor:
Bas Smit, University of Amsterdam

Office:
Sprouts
University of Amsterdam
Roetersstraat 11, Room E 2.74
1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
Email: admin@sprouts.aisnet.org

